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Price’s equation provides a very simple—and very general—encapsulation
of evolutionary change. It forms the mathematical foundations of several
topics in evolutionary biology, and has also been applied outwith evolution-
ary biology to a wide range of other scientific disciplines. However, the
equation’s combination of simplicity and generality has led to a number of
misapprehensions as to what it is saying and how it is supposed to be
used. Here, I give a simple account of what Price’s equation is, how it is
derived, what it is saying and why this is useful. In particular, I suggest
that Price’s equation is useful not primarily as a predictor of evolutionary
change but because it provides a general theory of selection. As an illus-
tration, I discuss some of the insights Price’s equation has brought to the
study of social evolution.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Fifty years of the Price equation’.1. Introduction
George R. Price (1922–1975) was a restless, obsessive thinker. His eclectic career
saw him working as a chemist on the Manhattan Project and at Bell Labora-
tories, writing about economics and extra-sensory perception as a science
journalist, developing mainframe computing at IBM, pursuing evolutionary
theory at the Galton Laboratory, undertaking biblical exegesis in relation to
the Easter story and becoming consumed by fundamentalist Christianity—
before his life was tragically cut short by suicide [1–3]. During his time in
London, Price made several major contributions to evolutionary theory [4],
including the first application of game theory to animal behaviour [5], a reinter-
pretation and proof of R. A. Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection
[6] and the derivation of the equation that now bears his name [7,8].
Price’s equation provides a very simple—and very general—encapsulation
of evolutionary change. Though first employed to capture the action of natural
selection in the context of evolutionary genetics [7], Price subsequently general-
ized it to encompass all forms of evolutionary change, with a diversity of
possible applications to biological and non-biological domains [8,9]. Price’s
equation now provides the formal underpinnings of several topics in evolution-
ary biology, particularly in relation to the evolution of social behaviour [10,11],
and it has found applications across a wide range of different disciplines,
from evolutionary biology to epidemiology [12] to community ecology [13] to
cosmology [14] to information theory [15].
However, the combination of simplicity and generality that gives Price’s
equation its power has also given rise to a range of misapprehensions as to
what the equation actually states and how it is properly employed. This is
understandable. Price’s equation is unusual in how it emerges from purely
notational definitions, rather than from the kind of mechanical assumptions
that more conventionally provide the building blocks of mathematical
models. Consequently—at some level—it does not tell us anything that we
did not already know.
Here, I aim to provide a simple account of what Price’s equation is, how it is
derived, what it is saying and why it is useful. On the way, I hope to dispel
certain confusions that have arisen as to its generality and its scientific value.
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2In particular, I will suggest that Price’s equation is useful not
primarily as a predictor of evolutionary change but because it
underpins a general theory of selection, and I will make clear
that although the equation has a deep connection with linear
regression, it does not in and of itself rest upon any linearity
assumption. I will provide a concrete illustration of the con-
ceptual usefulness of Price’s equation by considering some
of the insights it has brought to the study of social evolution.
2. Price’s equation
Price’s equation is a statement about the difference between
two assemblages. In its evolutionary biology applications,
the assemblages are usually two successive generations of a
biological population, so that the difference between them
describes how that population becomes transformed across a
single generation of evolutionary change. However, in other
applications, Price’s equation might be describing differences
between non-biological assemblages, and these differences
might be occurring through space or other dimensions,
rather than necessarily through time.
More specifically, Price’s equation describes the change
in the average value of some character of interest that
occurs between the two assemblages. The average value of
the character among the entities that make up the first
assemblage—which are usually termed the ‘parents’—is
denoted Ei∈I (zi), where zi is the character value of parent
i and I is the set of all parents. And the average value of
the character among the entities that make up the second
assemblage—which are usually termed the ‘offspring’—is
denoted Ei∈I (zi0), where zi0 is the character value ascribed
to the offspring of parent i. Accordingly, the difference in
the average value of the character between parent and off-
spring assemblages is ΔEi∈I (zi) = Ei∈I (zi0) – Ei∈I (zi), and Price’s
equation states that this difference is given by
DEi[I (zi) ¼ Covi[I(wi,zi)þ Ei[I(wiDzi) ð2:1Þ
where wi is the relative contribution made by parent i to the
offspring assemblage (this parent’s ‘fitness’) and Dzi ¼ z0i  zi
is the difference in character value between parent i and its
offspring (see box 1 for a full derivation).
That is, Price’s equation says that the change in the average
character value between parent and offspring assemblages is
equal to the sum of two quantities. The first quantity is the
covariance of fitness and character value across parents, and
this defines the action of selection. Selection favours an increase
in the trait insofar as it is associated with greater fitness. The
second quantity is the average of the product of fitness and
the character difference between parent and offspring, and
this defines the non-selective transmission portion of evolution-
ary change. Transmission effects contribute to evolutionary
change, interfering with the action of selection, when there
are systematic differences between parents and their offspring.
3. Vacuous or profound?
Price’s equation is a very general result, on account of the
way that it follows directly from definitions and hence is rela-
tively lacking in generality-limiting assumptions. The
equation emerges from rearrangement of notation rather
than, say, from physical laws, so it is not a prediction of the
change that occurs between the two aggregates but rather a
mathematical identity that shows one way in which suchchange can be expressed. Some have argued that this
makes the equation useless, in the sense that it does not tell
us anything we did not already know. However, I believe
that this view arises from a misunderstanding of how
Price’s equation is actually employed.
There is an old football joke, repeated by footballers down
the ages when they are asked how their team will ensure that
they win the next game. Their answer: ‘by scoring more goals
than the other team’. Van Veelen et al. [20] have likened
Price’s equation to this quip, saying that although the
equation is correct it is vacuous as it does not tell us anything
we did not already know. However, the pertinence of the
answer depends greatly on context. If a child is learning
how to play football, she might reasonably ask how her
team is to go about winning the game. And the answer to
her question is: ‘by scoring more goals than the other
team’. Far from being vacuous, the information conveyed in
this answer is absolutely crucial if one wants to know how
to win a game of football. Scoring more goals than the
other team is literally the aim of the game.
Price’s equation is saying something similar. It is not
making a substantive prediction about what population
change will occur in any particular context; this is something
that would require a more mechanistic model and a suite of
generality-limiting assumptions. Instead, Price’s equation is
defining evolutionary change—or, more properly, its com-
ponent parts. Importantly, Price’s equation provides a
completely general, formal definition of selection. This is
something that no mechanical model that makes particular,
generality-limiting assumptions is able to do—a mathematical
model may instantiate and exemplify selection, but it cannot
define selection unless the model assumptions apply as
generally as the concept of selection itself.
4. A theory of selection
Price’s equation highlights that there are two conceptual com-
ponents to evolution, namely selection and transmission. It
makes no a priori claim that either of these two components
has quantitative primacy over the other, but there is a sense
in which Price’s equation places greater conceptual impor-
tance upon the action of selection. This is because Price’s
equation emerges from the key constraint of conservation of
frequency [15]: in a strong sense, Price’s equation describes
evolutionary change as that which owes to changes in the
frequencies of things (i.e. selection) and that which does not
(i.e. everything else, collected under the umbrella-term ‘trans-
mission’). That is, first and foremost, Price’s equation provides
a general theory of selection, and insofar as it does also define
transmission, this is so as to carefully remove non-selective
effects from consideration.
This point highlights that while Price’s equation captures
the action of selection in terms of the mathematics of covari-
ance, it involves a rather special kind of covariance, which
we might term a ‘selection covariance’. Put another way,
although Price’s equation suggests that every kind of selection
can be represented as a covariance, not every covariance
admits a selection interpretation. Specifically, while covari-
ance, in general, refers to statistical association between two
random variables, a selection covariance requires that one of
these random variables admits an interpretation as a fitness
score—that is, a growth factor relating one proportion to
another, with the usual constraints applying to those
Box 1. Derivation of Price’s equation.
Price’s equation emerges from a mapping between two aggregates, termed ‘parents’ and ‘offspring’, respectively [4]. To make
this mapping, I first assign each parent a unique identifier; in the example below, each parent is assigned a number, so that I am
able to refer to ‘individual 1’, ‘individual 2’ and so on up to ‘individual 5’. More generally, I assign each parent a unique index i
∈ I, where i refers generically to an individual’s index and I is the set of all indices that have been assigned.
parents
1 2
3
54
offspring
Next, I assign each parent a relative abundance qi, denoting the extent to which they make up the population. In
many applications, the relative abundance is simply qi = 1/N for each of the N individuals existing in parental aggregate
(i.e. qi = 1/5 in the above example), but more generally one might wish to assign some of the individuals more weight
than others because, for instance, they might be physically larger. The important constraint here is that all the qi values,
as proportions, are constrained to take values between zero and one (i.e. 0 < qi≤ 1 for all i ∈ I ), and they are also constrained
to sum to one (i.e. ∑i∈I qi = 1). I then focus on a particular characteristic of these individuals, denoted by zi. This can be any
quantity that takes a real numerical value, representing any characteristic from the size of the individual’s antlers to the indi-
vidual’s proclivity to altruism. In the above example, it is represented by shading.
Turning to the offspring aggregate, I now map each offspring to one and only one parent, and I notate this mapping by
assigning each offspring the same index as its parent. In biological applications, one might have in mind asexual reproduc-
tion where each organism is descended from a single parent. However, the formalism readily extends to sexual reproduction,
for example, if the entities in the offspring aggregate are thought of as successful gametes that have been produced by
individuals in the parental aggregate. I then notate the relative abundance of the offspring of individual i as qi0 and this,
too, is constrained by its definition as a proportion (i.e. 0  q0i  1 for all i ∈ I and ∑i∈I q0i ¼ 1). The fitness of each parent
entity can then be defined as the relative growth of its lineage, wi ¼ q0i=qi ; note that this constrains all fitnesses to be non-
negative (i.e. wi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I ) and to be one on average (i.e. ∑i∈I qi wi =∑i∈I qi ðq0i=qiÞ ¼∑i∈I q0i ¼ 1Þ. Finally, I notate the
character value of the offspring of parent i by z0i ¼ zi þ Dzi, where Δzi simply describes how parent and offspring differ
and we impose no constraints on whether this quantity is positive or negative or zero. Where a parent has multiple offspring
that vary in their character value, one can interpret zi0 as an average taken over the brood.
With these definitions in place, the difference between the average trait value of the parent and offspring aggregates is
DEi[I(zi) ¼Ei[I(z0i) Ei[I (zi) ¼
X
i[I
q0iz
0
i 
X
i[I
qizi ¼
X
i[I
qiwiðzi þ DziÞ 
X
i[I
qizi ¼
X
i[I
qiwizi 
X
i[I
qizi þ
X
i[I
qiwiDzi
¼ Ei[I (wizi) Ei[I (wi)Ei[I (zi)þ Ei[I (wiDzi)
where, in the final line, I have made use of the fact that Ei[I (wi) ¼ 1. Noting that Ei[I (wizi) Ei[I (wi)Ei[I (zi) ¼ Covi[I (wi,zi),
I arrive at equation (2.1) of the main text
DEi[I (zi) ¼ Covi[I (wi,zi)þ Ei[I (wiDzi):
Price’s equation expresses overall evolutionary change as the sum of a ‘selection’ term ΔSEi∈I(zi)≡Covi∈I(wi,zi) and a
‘transmission’ term ΔTEi∈I(zi)≡ Ei∈I(wiΔzi). These terms provide very general definitions of the concepts of selection and trans-
mission that apply across a very wide domain, including the biological and the non-biological, and to evolutionary changes
occurring through time as well as to other kinds of population transformation that occur across space and other dimensions.
In many applications, it is desirable to express the action of selection as an expectation over future uncertainty as to how
the offspring aggregation will be constituted, and to thereby eliminate chance effects [16]. To implement this, I assign every
possible outcome a unique index ω and I denote the set of all possible outcomes Ω. Then, the total expected change between
parent and offspring aggregates is given by
Ev[V (DEi[I(zi)
v) ¼ Ev[VðCovi[I(wvi ,zi)Þ þ Ev[V(Ei[I(wvi Dzvi )) ¼ Covi[I(Ev[V(wvi ),zi)þ Ev[V(Ei[I(wvi Dzvi )),
which recovers ΔSEi∈I (zi)≡Covi∈I (wi,zi) so long as we understand fitness wi ¼ Ev[V(wvi ) to represent an expectation with
respect to future uncertainty, rather than a measure of reproductive success realized under any particular outcome [16].
Of particular interest is the application of Price’s equation to the concept of natural selection [7,17,18]. This is a particular
kind of selection, in which the unit of selection (notated by i) is a biological organism, the arena of selection (notated by I ) is
a population of such organisms, the character under selection (notated by z) is the heritable component of an organism’s
phenotype (given by a weighted sum of the alleles carried by the individual; [7]) and the target of selection (notated by
w) is the organism’s Darwinian fitness (see [19] for more discussion).
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4proportions (each proportion falls in the unit interval and the
sum of all proportions is equal to one).
More generally, consideration of the mathematical com-
ponents of a selection covariance reveals that there are four
basic elements underpinning the logic of selection [19].
First, associated with any selection covariance is the concept
of the unit of selection. This is the entity class in the parental
aggregate that I have indexed by i. In standard evolutionary
scenarios, the unit of selection is the individual organism.
Second, there is the concept of the arena of selection. This is
the set of all the units that defines the aggregate itself,
which is notated by I. In standard evolutionary scenarios,
the arena of selection is a biological population. Third,
there is the concept of the character under selection. This is
the character of interest notated as z in the selection covari-
ance, and in evolutionary scenarios, this is often the
genetical portion of an organismal phenotype. Fourth, there
is the concept of the target of selection, notated as w. This is
the quantity whose covariance with the character drives the
action of selection, and in evolutionary scenarios, it defines
the concept of fitness.
Price’s encapsulation of the action of selection differs
strikingly from how selection is more usually captured in
population genetics models. The difference in approach
arises from a difference in aims. With population genetics
models, the aim is usually to provide a prediction of evol-
utionary change, under the action of natural selection and
other non-Darwinian forces, across a number of generations.
To give the model solidity, the population geneticist focuses
on that which is unchanging, i.e. the allele or genotype,
and describes how the frequencies of the different alleles
and genotypes change over the course of evolution. In con-
trast with this typological approach, Price’s equation
typically pushes alleles and genotypes into the background
(perhaps leaving them implicit, or even dispensing with
these concepts altogether) and instead focuses attention on
the individual organism and her personal idiosyncracies, for-
malizing the way in which natural selection favours the fittest
individuals and consequently generates whole-organismal
adaptations.
In other words, Price’s equation represents a return to the
original Darwinian logic of natural selection. This was per-
haps best demonstrated by Price [7] when he showed that
the selection covariance can be expressed as the product of
the least-squares linear regression of fitness against character
value and the variance in character value
DSEi[I (zi) ¼ Covi[I(wi,zi) ¼ bi[I(wi,zi)Vari[I(zi), ð4:1Þ
as this captures Darwin’s basic argument that selection
occurs when there is variation in a character of interest
(Vari∈I (zi)≠ 0) that is correlated with fitness (βi∈I(wi,zi)≠ 0).
This link between the action of natural selection and
the mathematics of least-squares linear regression—first
grasped by Fisher [21]—has been much misunderstood.
Some authors have interpreted it as meaning that
Price’s equation assumes linearity or additivity, and that it is
therefore liable to give incorrect results in the context of
more complex relationships between genes, phenotypes and
fitness. However, this is incorrect; Price’s equation is instead
showing that natural selection only cares about additive
effects: irrespective of the goodness of the least-squares
straight-line fit, the product of the slope of this straight lineand the heritable variance correctly describes the action of
natural selection.5. Insights for social evolution
Owing to Price’s close interactions with W. D. Hamilton, the
first applications of Price’s equation were to the field of
social evolution [8,22,23]. Here, the equation has provided
major conceptual insights, particularly into the relationship
between kin selection and group selection [23,24], and it
now provides the formal foundations for both of these social
evolutionary topics [10,11].
During the first half of the twentieth century, it was com-
monplace for biologists to unreflectively invoke Darwinism
in order to explain the evolution of adaptations that appeared
to function for the good of the species. Often, the basic
assumption was that whatever phenotypes benefit the indi-
vidual must also benefit the whole social group and
ultimately the entire species. And many supposed that,
even if a trait were to be detrimental to the individual, it
would nevertheless be favoured by natural selection, pro-
vided it yielded a benefit for the species as a whole.
However, during the middle years of the century, it became
increasingly clear that the fitness interests of the individual
can come into conflict with those of her wider social group.
This spurred theoretical attention into the evolution of
altruistic behaviour, in which the individual sacrifices some
or all of her own reproductive success in order to improve
the reproductive success of her social partners.
Two competing explanations for altruism soon emerged,
both having their roots in Darwin’s own work. First, the kin
selection explanation suggested that altruism can be favoured
by natural selection, despite the fitness cost to the altruist,
provided that this leads to a sufficiently large benefit for
her relatives, who will tend to share copies of the altruism
allele and hence pass it onto subsequent generations via
their own reproductive success [25–27]. Second, the group
selection explanation suggested that altruism can be favoured,
despite placing the altruist at a disadvantage relative to the
rest of her social group, provided that it yields a large
enough benefit for the group as a whole [27,28]. The rest of
the century saw a heated debate between these two view-
points, with theoreticians scrambling to develop population
genetical models of kin selection and group selection to
evaluate which was likely to be the most important driver
of altruism in the natural world [29].
Price’s equation has been identified as largely resolving
this debate, by showing that the kin selection and group
selection approaches to social evolution are actually just
different ways of describing the very same thing. The key
to establishing their mathematical equivalence has been to
provide a general encapsulation of natural selection and to
show how this can be re-expressed in alternative kin selection
versus group selection forms [23]. The kin selection approach
takes the overall covariance between individual trait and
fitness across the whole population and, using multiple
regression, divides this into two separate components: the
first component is the part of fitness that owes to the
impact that an individual’s trait has on her own fitness and
the second component is the part of fitness that owes to the
impact of social partners’ traits on each others’ fitness, with
the kin selection coefficient of relatedness emerging as a
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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5statistical regression of social partner genotypes (box 2). The
group selection approach takes exactly the same overall
covariance between individual trait and fitness across the
whole population and, using the law of total covariance,
divides this into two components in a different way: the
first component is the portion of the trait–fitness covariance
that occurs at the between-group level and the second com-
ponent is the portion of the trait-fitness covariance that
occurs at the within-group level (box 2).
Owing to the way in which more-standard population
genetics models tend to rest upon generality-limiting
mechanistic assumptions, with the modeller aiming to
develop the simplest model that captures the desired effects,
the usual population genetics approach to modelling kin
selection or group selection has been to build upon more
basic models of natural selection by adding extra mechanistic
assumptions to incorporate these evolutionary forces. This
has led to a persistent misconception that kin and group
selection are not part of standard natural selection, but some-
thing extra to be invoked only in special circumstances—such
as when our attention turns to altruistic behaviour. By con-
trast, by framing selection in its full generality from the
outset, Price’s equation reveals that kin and group selection
are components of natural selection, and we obtain their
dynamics by drawing them out of—rather than adding
them into—the basic form of Price’s equation. Moreover, by
showing how the kin selection and group selection view-
points both emerge from the mathematics of natural
selection, Price’s equation shows that these are not competing
hypotheses for the evolution of social behaviour but simply
different ways of conceptualizing the very same evolutionary
process—and that a fierce, decades-long debate had been lar-
gely over nothing. This powerfully illustrates just how useful
a general theory of natural selection can be.
In addition to clarifying the logical connections between
kin selection and group selection, Price’s equation has also
yielded fundamental insights into each of these topics
separately. With regard to kin selection, perhaps the first
insight was that genetic relatedness, as a statistical regression
coefficient, may take negative as well as non-negative
values—which means that an individual is genetically less
similar to her social partner than she is, on average, to a
random member of her population—and this breakthrough
paved the way for a theory of the evolution of spiteful behav-
iour [1, p.173; 22]. More generally, Price’s equation dispels a
persistent misconception that Hamilton’s rule assumes addi-
tivity of gene action, by showing that it emerges in a fully
general form directly from the action of natural selection
itself (see [31] for more discussion). Finally, Price’s equation
makes clear the unit of selection within the theory of kin selec-
tion: while some researchers have conflated kin selection with
the ‘gene’s eye view’ or have argued that it is a type of group
selection in which selection operates at the level of the ‘kin
group’, Price’s equation makes clear that the standard framing
of kin selection is as an individual-level process, driven by a
covariance between individual trait and individual fitness.
Similarly, Price’s equation has provided clarity to the
topic of group selection, in showing that there are two dis-
tinct selection covariances at work: the first corresponding
to between-group selection, with the group itself representing
the unit of selection; and the second corresponding to within-
group selection, with the individual representing the unit of
selection. In contrast with earlier suggestions that, whereverthe interest of individual and group are in conflict, it is
necessarily the group’s interests that prevail [28], Price’s
equation shows that a priori there is no reason to suspect
that either of the two selection covariances will fully domi-
nate the other. Moreover, while a ‘contextual analysis’
[11,33] partition of natural selection has been touted as pro-
viding an alternative theory of group selection, a Pricean
examination of the elements of the corresponding selection
covariance reveals that it takes the individual organism as
the unit of selection and the individual’s fitness as the
target of selection, such that it is not capturing group
selection in any traditional sense of the term [34].
6. Discussion
Price’s equation provides a very general description of evol-
utionary change, but it has generated some confusion as to
what it is really saying and how it is supposed to be used.
Here, I have argued that its primary usefulness is in provid-
ing a general theory of selection, by isolating the Darwinian
portion of evolution from the rest of evolutionary change.
Why do we need a general definition of selection? First,
this definition enables us to cut to the heart of the concept
of selection, stripping away features that are extraneous
rather than integral to the concept. Darwin’s theory of natural
selection was inspired by Malthus’s view that the intrinsic
multiplicative nature of biological reproduction inevitably
leads to intense competition for limiting resources, such
that the growth of one lineage or population tends to
impact negatively upon the growth of its competitors, and
this resource competition has often been seen as a defining
feature of natural selection. But resource competition does
not feature explicitly within Price’s equation, and this reveals
that it is not a fundamental component of the logic of Dar-
winism. Indeed, natural selection occurs even when genetic
lineages grow exponentially—provided that they grow at
different rates.
Second, if we did not have a general formal definition of
selection, then there would be potential for different research-
ers to be talking about quite different things when they use
the term natural selection, resulting in complicated and
mutually incompatible predictions. It might appear that
everyone understands exactly what natural selection is, or
at least sufficiently well to carry out useful biological
research, but the pervasiveness of vacuous ‘for the good of
the species’ thinking during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury makes clear that this is by no means correct. Having a
purely notational meta-model that captures all specific scen-
arios enables evolutionary biologists to be sure that they are
talking about the same thing when they talk about natural
selection.
Third, when formal definitions are lacking, it is possible
for researchers to believe that they are talking about different
things when they are actually talking about the same thing.
With the eventual realization during the middle years of
the twentieth century that natural selection does not straight-
forwardly work for the good of the species, a heated,
decades-long debate raged over whether kin selection or
group selection better explained the evolution of altruistic be-
haviour. Price’s meta-model of natural selection, with its
ready application to social effects and to selection in hier-
archically structured populations, provides a means of
proving that (in general, and not just in particular special
Box 2. Kin selection and group selection.
The kin selection approach uses multiple regression to separate the overall association between an individual’s genetical trait
and her relative fitness into the direct effect of her own trait on her own fitness and the indirect effect of her genetically related
social partner’s trait on her own fitness, the latter indirect effect driving the action of kin selection [30,31]. Mathematically, this
may be written as
βi∈I (wi,zi) = βi∈I (wi,zi|Zi) + βi∈I (wi,Zi|zi) βi∈I (Zi,zi)
where βi∈I (wi,zi|Zi) =−c describes the partial effect of the individual’s own trait value zi on her own fitness wi, holding fixed
the trait value Zi of her social partner; βi∈I (wi,Zi|zi) = b describes the partial effect of the individual’s social partner’s trait
value Zi on her fitness wi, holding fixed her own trait value zi; and βi∈I (Zi,zi) = r describes the statistical association between
the genetical trait values of social partners, i.e. the kin selection coefficient of genetic relatedness (a graphical illustration of this
multiple regression analysis is provided below). Accordingly, from equation (4.1), the condition for natural selection to favour
an increase in the average level of the genetical trait is βi∈I (wi,zi) > 0 and hence −c + br > 0, i.e. Hamilton’s [22,25,26] rule of kin
selection. This result pertains to the scenario in which social partners interact in relation to only one role, for example, when
individuals are all directly equivalent and interact in pairs, but it readily extends to encompass social partners interacting in
multiple roles [32].
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This foregoing account of kin selection has been framed in terms of the personal fitness approach, which describes how an
individual’s personal fitness is modulated by the phenotypes of her social partners (potentially including herself; [26]). An
alternative framing of kin selection is provided by the inclusive fitness approach, which describes how an individual’s phe-
notype modulates the fitnesses of her social partners (potentially including herself; [26]). These two approaches yield
different notions of fitness at the individual level, but they describe exactly the same selective phenomenon when these fit-
ness effects are aggregated across the entire population (see [31] for more discussion).
A different way of partitioning the overall action of natural selection is achieved by separating individuals into discrete
groups and decomposing the population-level covariance of fitness and trait value into the portion that exists at the between-
group level plus the portion that exists at the within-group level. This group selection approach emerges from a simple appli-
cation of the law of total covariance, and expresses the overall action of natural selection as
ΔSEi∈I(zi) = Covj∈J(Ek∈K(wjk), Ek∈K(zjk)) + Ej∈J(Covk∈K(wjk,zjk))
where I have assigned every group a unique index j ∈ J and every individual within a given group a unique index k ∈ K
[8,23]. The first term in this sum describes the covariance, across all the groups in the population, of the average fitness and
average trait value within each group, and this defines the action of between-group selection. The second term describes the
average, across all the groups in the population, of the covariance of fitness and trait value within each group, and this defines
the action of within-group selection. (An illustration of this group selection partition, in which individuals are represented by
discs and group boundaries by dashing, is given below.) While the above result pertains to a simple scenario in which indi-
viduals are arranged into groups, with no further hierarchical structuring of the population, the selection covariance
mathematics also readily extends to scenarios with an arbitrary number of levels of biological organization.
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Note that the between-group portion of natural selection can be expressed as Covj∈J (Wj, Zj), where group fitness Wj =
Ek∈K(wjk) is defined as the average of the fitness of its constituent members, and group trait Zj = Ek∈K(zjk) is defined as the aver-
age of the traits of its constituent members. That is, between-group selection is directly analogous to standard, individual-level
natural selection, butwith the group taking on the role of the unit of selection, the group’s phenotype acting as the character under
selection and group fitness being the target of selection [19]. This contrasts with an alternative, ‘contextual analysis’ approach
to group selection [11,33], which defines group selection in terms of the impact of group phenotype on individual fitness,
such that the individual organism remains the unit of selection and the individual’s fitness remains the target of selection [34].
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7cases) the kin selection and group selection approaches
to natural selection simply represent different ways of
describing the very same evolutionary process.
Fourth, by stripping away extraneous, context-specific
details and framing selection in a more fundamental way,
surprising and informative connections may be made
between dramatically different topics (see [15] for an over-
view). Some of the connections between selection and other
concepts have been sufficiently surprising to have been a
source of confusion—for example, the way in which the
language of selection is formally related to least-squares
linear regression has confused some researchers into thinking
that, in order to yield correct results, Price’s equation requires
that a linearity assumption be met. Arguably, all humanunderstanding ultimately rests upon analogy, and so by
making explicit the formal connections between different dis-
ciplines, we are better placed to take insights that have been
hard-won in some domains and translate them into new
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